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Abstract
The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) implies that
QM is a contextual theory and that the probability measures associated
with quantum states do not satisfy the assumptions of Kolmogorov’s prob-
ability theory. These features of QM are shared nowadays by other scien-
tific theories, as some quantum-like models of cognitive phenomena. We
aim to show that contextuality may lead to explain non-Kolmogorovian
probabilities in Kolmogorovian terms by referring to a class T of theo-
ries in which entities, states, properties and contexts play a basic role.
To this end we introduce a propositional language L whose propositions
embody a reference to microscopic contexts (µ-contexts), a classical prob-
ability measure on the set of all propositions of L and a family of classical
probability measures on sets of µ-contexts, each element of the family
corresponding to a.macroscopic measurement context associated with a
measurement procedure. This classical framework characterizes a sub-
class TµMP ⊂ T of theories in which mean conditional probabilities on a
subset of propositions of L and q-probabilities on the set of all properties
can be defined which admit an epistemic interpretation but generally do
not satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms. If one maintains that QM belongs to
T
µMP , then quantum probabilities can be interpreted as examples of q-
probabilities, which shows that they can be obtained as derived notions
in a Kolmogorovian framework whenever contextuality is taken into ac-
count, explains how they can be non-classical and provides them with an
epistemic interpretation. As a by-product, the distinction between com-
patible and incompatible properties is explained in a natural way, and
purely theoretical classical conditional probabilities are shown to coexist
with empirically testable quantum conditional probabilities.
Key words: Contextuality, non-Kolmogorovian probabilities, quan-
tum probability, quantum measurement.
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1 Introduction
Probability enters quantum mechanics (QM) via Born’s rule and is usually in-
terpreted in terms of frequencies of the outcomes obtained when measurements
are performed. However, it turns out to be non-Kolmogorovian, in the sense
that the probability measures associated with quantum states do not satisfy the
assumptions of Kolmogorov’s probability theory. In particular, the set of events
for every probability measure associated with a quantum state is the orthomod-
ular lattice of standard quantum logic (QL), which is nondistributive (except for
some special cases), at variance with the set of events in Kolmogorov’s theory,
which is a Boolean lattice.
Another well known nonclassical feature of QM is the doctrine that, when-
ever a physical system in a given state is considered, a quantum observable
generally has not a prefixed value but only a set of potential values, and that a
measurement actualizes one of these values, yielding an outcome that depends
on the specific measurement procedure that is adopted (contextuality). This
doctrine is usually maintained to be proven correct by some ”no-go” theorems
that supply a mathematical support to the standard (Copenhagen) interpre-
tation of QM and show, in particular, that contextuality occurs also in the
case of measurements on far-away subsystems of a composite physical system
(nonlocality). This, according to Einstein’s view, either means that QM is an
incomplete theory or implies a ”spooky action at a distance” (hence the famous
”EPR paradox”).1
Because of contextuality, it is a widespread belief that quantum probabil-
ity measures do not admit an epistemic interpretation (the term epistemic is
meant here in a broad sense, i.e., as referring to our degree of knowledge/lack
of knowledge). Indeed, generally one cannot consider a property of a quantum
system as either possessed or not possessed by the system independently of any
measurement, even if the state of the system is known. Hence one cannot look
at the values of the probability measure associated with the state as indexes of
the degree of ignorance of the properties possessed by the system. Probability
should rather be seen as an intrinsic feature of the microworld, which leads to
classify it as ontic.
The standard view expounded above is obviously legitimate, but further
investigation on the links between quantum probability and contextuality may
suggest alternative views. We intend to inquire into these links in the present
paper from a general point of view, that is by considering a class T of theories
in which the basic notions of physical system (or entity), state, property and
macroscopic context are introduced. Hence we will refer to the mathematical
1There is a huge literature on these topics, which goes back to the early days of QM. We
limit ourselves here to recall that the EPR and the QL issues were started by the famous
papers by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen (1935) and by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936),
respectively, while the nonlocality and, more generally, the contextuality of QM were accepted
by most physicists as ”mathematically proven” after the publication of Bell’s (1964, 1966)
and Kochen-Specker’s (1967) theorems (later supported by numerous different proofs of the
same or similar theorems, among which, in particular, the proof of nonlocality provided by
Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger, 1990, which does not resort to inequalities).
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machinery of QM only when dealing with the special case of this theory.2
At the best of our knowledge, our approach is innovative, as it focuses on the
analysis of the basic language of the theories in T, thus adopting a methodology
that is typical of analytic philosophy but rather unusual in physics. Let us
therefore summarily describe it.
First of all, after some epistemological and physical preliminaries (Sections
2 and 3, respectively), we work out in Section 4 a propositional language L
that, for every T ∈ T in which every macroscopic context can be associated
with a set of microscopic contexts (µ-contexts), formalizes a fragment of the
natural language expressing basic features of the entities considered in T . The
set of elementary (or atomic) propositions of L is partitioned into a subset of
atomic state propositions and a subset of atomic context-depending propositions.
A proposition of the former subset affirms that an entity H of T is in a given
state. A proposition of the latter subset affirms that an entity H of T possesses
a given property in a given µ-context (we stress that no atomic proposition
assigning a property of H without referring to a µ-context exists in L). Then
we select a subclass TµMP ⊂ T by introducing a classical probability measure
on the set of all (atomic and molecular) propositions of L (Section 5) and a
family of classical probability measures defined on subsets of µ-contexts (Section
6), each element of the family corresponding to a measurement procedure that
determines a macroscopic measurement context associated with a property. We
can thus define a notion of compatibility in the set of all properties of L, hence
a notion of testability in the set of all propositions of L, and use the foregoing
classical probability measures conjointly to define the notion ofmean conditional
probability on the subset of all testable propositions, together with the related
notion of mean probability test. Hence mean conditional probabilities admit an
epistemic interpretation, but are not bound to satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms,
because they are obtained by averaging over classical probability measures.
Based on the definitions and results expounded above we focus (Section 7)
on the set E of all properties, on which a family of mappings E −→ [0, 1] can be
introduced by means of mean conditional probabilities, parametrized by the set
S of all states. This family induces a preorder relation ≺ on E . We show that,
if suitable structural conditions are satisfied, each element of the family is a
generalized probability measure (or q-probability) on (E , ≺), which reduces to a
classical probability measure whenever (E , ≺) is a Boolean lattice. Generalized
probability measures can be empirically tested and admit an epistemic interpre-
tation, but generally do not satisfy Kolmogorov’s assumptions. Moreover, they
allow the definition of a new kind of conditioning that refers to a sequence of
2A valuable ”contextual approach to quantum formalism” has been provided by Khren-
nikov (2009a, 2009b) in the framework of the ”Va¨xjo¨ school”. This approach, however, is
basically different from ours. Khrennikov considers indeed contexts ”as a generalization of
a widely used notion of preparation procedure” (2009b), which includes also selection proce-
dures that are registration procedures in the sense of Ludwig (1983). In our approach, instead,
macroscopic measurement procedures are associated with macroscopic measurement contexts,
which seems to be compatible with Khrennikov’s view, but an essential role is played by mi-
croscopic contexts underlying macroscopic measurement contexts, which are not considered
by Khrennikov.
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measurements and is conceptually different from classical conditioning.
We are thus ready to discuss the implications of our framework in some spe-
cial cases, such as classical mechanics (CM), statistical mechanics (SM) and QM,
that can be maintained to belong to T. Leaving apart SM for the sake of brevity,
we firstly show in Section 8.1 that all the notions introduced above collapse into
familiar notions in CM, consistently with the non-contextual character of this
theory. Then we consider QM in Section 8.2 and attain the following results.
(i) The probability measures on the set of properties induced by the Born
rule in QM can be considered as the specific form that q-probabilities take in
QM. Hence they are interpreted as derived notions within a Kolmogorovian
framework and their non-classical character can be explained in classical terms.
This explanation implies that quantum probability can be provided with an
epistemic rather than an ontic interpretation by taking into account µ-contexts.
(ii) The quantum relation of compatibility on the set of all physical prop-
erties can be considered as the specific form that the relation of compatibility
introduced in the general framework takes in QM.
(iii) The conditional probability usually introduced in QM can be considered
as the specific form that the new kind of conditioning introduced in the general
framework takes in QM.3
Finally, we close our paper with some conclusive remarks (Section 9), and
then add an Appendix. This addition is motivated by the fact that the notions of
mean conditional probability and mean probability test are conceptually similar
to the notions of universal average and universal measurement, respectively,
introduced by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (see, e.g., 2014, 2017). In particular,
in the case of QM our approach provides a description of the measurements
testing probabilities that reminds the proposal of these authors.4 But there
are also some relevant differences between the two approaches (in particular,
quantum probability is considered as ontic by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi, while
we prove in the present paper that it also admits an epistemic interpretation, as
explained above). Our Appendix therefore aims to provide a brief and intuitive
account of the aforesaid similarities and differences.
3The results (i)-(iii) have been anticipated in a recent paper (Garola, 2018). In the present
article we propose a more general view by replacing, in particular, the predicate language
introduced in the previous paper with a propositional language L. This replacement allows
us to avoid referring to individual objects and to consider only tests of probabilities. When
dealing with QM we can thus refer to a minimal (statistical) interpretation of this theory
(see, e.g., Ballentine, 1970; Busch et al., 1996), so that our results are not restricted to an
interpretation that is ”realistic” in the sense explained above. Individual objects are here
called into play only to supply an elementary model of probability tests that is closer to
physical intuition.
4We stress that our general framework does not constitute a hidden variables theory for
QM, at least in a standard sense. Indeed, µ-contexts are associated (generally many-to-one)
with macroscopic measurement procedures, not with states or properties of the entity that
is being measured. Our perspective reminds instead Aerts’ hidden measurements approach
(1986).
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2 Epistemological preliminaries
According to the epistemological view called standard epistemological concep-
tion, or received view (see, e.g., Braithwaite, 1953; Nagel, 1961; Hempel, 1965;
Carnap, 1966), a fully-developed physical theory T is in principle expressible by
means of a metalanguage in which a theoretical language LT , an observational
language LO and correspondence (or epistemic) rules RC connecting LT and
LO can be distinguished. The theoretical apparatus of T , expressed by means of
LT , includes a mathematical structure and, usually, an intended interpretation
which is a direct and complete physical model of the mathematical structure
(this model is often anticipated by the choice of the nouns of the theoretical
terms and it is not indispensable in principle, but plays a fundamental role in
the intuitive comprehension, justification and development of the theory; think,
e.g., to the trajectories of point-like particles in CM or to the geometrical repre-
sentation of electromagnetic waves). The observational language LO describes
instead an empirical domain, hence it has a semantic interpretation, so that
the correspondence rules RC provide an empirical interpretation of the mathe-
matical structure. Such an interpretation, however, is often complicate and/or
problematic (e.g., one-dimensional orthogonal projection operators may repre-
sent both a pure state and a dichotomic observable in QM, i.e., different physical
entities). Moreover, it is generally indirect, in the sense that there are theoretical
entities that are connected with the empirical domain only via derived theoret-
ical entities, and incomplete, in the sense that only limited ranges of values of
the theoretical entities are interpreted (e.g., self-adjoint operators correspond
in QM to measuring apparatuses whose outcomes match the eigenvalues of the
operators only in finite intervals of the real axis).
The received view has been criticized by some authors (see, e.g. Kuhn,
1962; Feyerabend, 1975) and is nowadays maintained to be outdated by several
scholars. Nevertheless, we deem that its basic ideas are still epistemologically
relevant. In particular, this view led us to focus our attention on the languages
of physical theories, suggesting to explore their similarities and differences by
analysing their syntax and semantics to find out the roots of several open prob-
lems in the foundations of such theories. The results that we have obtained
following that suggestion are sometimes unexpected and challenge well estab-
lished beliefs (see, e.g., Garola and Sozzo, 2013; Garola et al., 2016; Garola,
2017; Garola, 2018).
We add that in the standard language of physical theories the distinctions
introduced by the received view are usually overlooked, and the various linguis-
tic components are mixed together (e.g., the term “observable” may denote in
QM a self-adjoint operator on a Hilbert space H, and in this sense it belongs to
LT , but also a physical entity associated with a set of measurement procedures,
and in this sense it belongs to LO; the term “state” may denote a vector of H,
but also a physical entity associated with a set of preparing procedures; etc.).
Only a rational reconstruction of the language of a theory can lead to clearly
distinguish the various elements that occur in it according to the received view.
For the sake of simplicity we therefore retain here some of the basic ideas of such
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view that we consider epistemologically relevant, but adopt a simpler scheme.
To be precise, we maintain that every advanced scientific theory T is expressible
by means of a fragment of the natural language enriched with technical terms
and is characterized by a pair (F, I), with F a logical and mathematical formal-
ism that may have an intended interpretation and I an empirical interpretation,
indirect and incomplete in the sense explained above, that establishes connec-
tions between F and an empirical domain. Moreover, in some locutions (as “the
minimal interpretation of QM”, etc.) the interpretation I will be distinguished
from the theory, following a standard use.
3 Physical preliminaries
The main ideas for our general treatment are suggested by a typical case of
contextual theory, i.e. QM. Therefore we consider this theory in the present
section. For the sake of intuitivity we refer here to the ”realistic” interpreta-
tion of QM mentioned at the end of Section 1, according to which QM deals
with individual objects and their properties, even if our general theory avoids
referring to individual objects, as anticipated in Section 1. Moreover, we adopt
a standard physical language in which the distinctions emphasized in Section 2
are not explicitly introduced.
First of all we recall that in most presentations of QM the notions of physical
system, or entity, (physical) property and (physical) state are fundamental, and
that, according to some known approaches to the foundations of QM (see, e.g.,
Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981; Ludwig, 1983), states are interpreted as classes
of probabilistically equivalent preparation procedures, or preparing devices, and
properties as classes of probabilistically equivalent dichotomic (yes-no) regis-
tering devices. This interpretation suggests an intuitive explanation of the fact
that QM yields only probabilistic predictions. Indeed, one can adopt a picture
according to which a microscopic world underlies the macroscopic world of our
everyday experience and note that there are two possible sources of randomness
for the outcomes of a measurement, as follows (see also Khrennikov, 2015).
(i) When an individual object is prepared by activating a preparation pro-
cedure associated with a state S, we control only macroscopic variables, not
the physical situation at a microscopic level. Thus different individual objects
produced by the preparation procedure are not bound to possess the same prop-
erties.
(ii) When a registering device is activated to perform a measurement, many
microscopic contexts can be associated with it, and different microscopic con-
texts that we cannot control may affect in different ways the outcome of the
measurement.
The picture above, however, does not distinguish QM from SM. This crucial
distinction can be established as follows. Consider a preparation procedure pi
in the class S. When activated, pi produces an individual object x (which can
be identified with the act of activation itself if one wants to avoid ontological
commitments). Hence, after the activation a sentence that affirms that x is in
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the state S is true and a sentence that affirms that x is in a state S′ 6= S is false.
Then, given an individual object x in the state S, activating a registering device
r in the class E tests whether the property E is possessed or not by x, but the
result of the test generally depends on the set of properties (pairwise compatible
and compatible with E) that are tested together with E. It follows in fact
from some known proofs of Bell’s and Kochen-Specker’s theorems mentioned in
Section 1 (see, e.g., Greenberger et al., 1990; Mermin 1993) that, if the laws of
QM have to be preserved in every conceivable physical situation, the outcome
that is obtained depends on the set of the registering devices that are activated
together with r, i.e., on the macroscopic context Cm determined by the whole
(macroscopic) measurement m that is performed. Briefly, QM is a contextual
theory.5
Contextuality means that it is impossible in QM to assign a truth value
to a sentence stating that x has (or possesses) a property E disregarding the
measurement context. In other words, the natural everyday language and the
technical language of classical physics, whose elementary sentences state prop-
erties of individual objects independently of any observation, are unsuitable for
QM (which is the source of most ”quantum paradoxes” in our opinion). This
fundamental feature of QM was clearly implicit in Bohr’s olistic view (see, e.g.,
Bohr, 1958) or in Heisenberg’s distinction between ”potential” and ”actual”
properties (see, e.g., Heisenberg, 1958), but it was maintained to be defini-
tively ”mathematically proven” only after the statement of Bell’s and Kochen-
Specker’s theorems quoted above.6
At first sight one can think that a possible answer to the problems raised
by the contextuality of QM is assuming that the basic language of QM is the
nonstandard logic of quantum propositions introduced by Birkhoff and von Neu-
mann (1936), which implies a nonclassical notion of truth (quantum truth) ac-
5We have emphasized in some previous papers (see, e.g., Garola, 1999; Garola and Pykacz,
2004; Garola and Sozzo, 2010; Garola and Persano, 2014) that the epistemological clause
”the laws of QM have to be preserved in every conceivable physical situation” is essential
in the proofs of Bell’s and Kochen-Specker’s theorems. Nevertheless, this clause generally
is not explicitly noticed or stated, possibly because it seems to be unquestionably justified
by the outstanding success of QM. Yet it must be observed that all the proofs mentioned
above proceed ab absurdo, considering physical situations in which noncompatible physical
properties are assumed to be simultaneously possessed by an individual object and showing
that this assumption leads to contradictions with well established quantum laws. But in the
aforesaid situations the quantum laws that are applied can never be simultaneously tested,
hence hypothesizing that they hold anyway seems more consistent with a classical than with
a quantum view. One can therefore try to give up the aforesaid clause, but then the proofs of
Bell’s an Kochen-Specker’s theorems cannot be completed. This conclusion opens the way to
the attempt at recovering noncontextual interpretations of QM (see, e.g., Garola et al., 2016).
The arguments in the present paper, however, apply to every theory in which contexts can be
defined, irrespective of whether the results of measurements are context-depending (locally,
or also at a distance) or not.
6We stated in footnote 5 that Bell’s and Kochen-Specker’s theorems rest not only on
standard assumptions (often called ”realism” and ”locality”) but also on a further hypothesis
that usually remains unnoticed, hence it is implicitly accepted, even if, in principle, it could be
rejected. Of course, its rejection would lead to question the contextuality of QM. We however
adhere to the standard view in the present paper.
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cording to some autors (see, e.g., Re´dei, 1998; Dalla Chiara et al., 2004). But
this answer does not grasp the point in our opinion. Indeed, we have proven
in some previous papers that quantum logic can be embedded (preserving the
order but not the algebraic structure) into a classical logic (Garola, 2008; Garola
and Sozzo, 2013) or into a pragmatic extension of classical logic (Garola, 2017).
Moreover, these results are supported by some former results that show that
there are examples of classical macroscopic systems that exhibit a quantum
structure (see, e.g., Aerts, 1999).
On the other side, one can maintain that contextuality, implying a break-
down with a classical view of the world, is a fundamental feature that should
be incorporated into the basic language of QM rather than recognized at a
later stage. By associating this idea with the above picture of the sources of
randomness in QM, we observe that, generally, the macroscopic context Cm de-
termined by a macroscopic measurement m may be produced by many different
microscopic physical situations that cannot be distinguished at a macroscopic
level (though they can be described, in principle, by QM itself). Hence we can
associate Cm with a set Cm of microscopic contexts (µ-contexts ; of course, Cm
could reduce to a singleton in special cases) and then assume that the truth
value of a sentence asserting that x possesses the property E generally depends
on m through the µ-context that is realized when m is performed. But we can-
not know this µ-context, hence only a probability can be given which expresses
our degree of ignorance of it (we naively argue here as though the set Cm were
discrete, to avoid technical complications).
Summing up, our picture leads us to conclude that a truth value can be
assigned consistently with QM only in the case of a sentence asserting that an
individual object x possesses a property E in a given µ-context c, not in the case
of a sentence simply asserting that x possesses a property E. Moreover, in gen-
eral this value cannot be deduced from the laws of QM, which are probabilistic
laws that make no explicit reference to contexts.
The conclusions above have an important consequence. Every quantum
prediction concerns probabilities, hence in our present perspective testing it re-
quires evaluating frequencies of outcomes. A typical test of this kind consists in
preparing a broad set of individual objects in a given state S and then perform-
ing on each object the same macroscopic measurement m by activating one or
more (compatible) registering devices. The macroscopic context Cm then is the
same for every individual object, but the µ-context c ∈ Cm generally changes in
an unpredictable way. Thus we meet two distinct sources of randomness. The
first is the state S (be it a pure state or a mixture) that may not determine
univocally the properties of an individual object in QM, even if the µ-context c
is given (see (i) above). The second is the unpredictable change of the µ-context
that occurs when performing m on different individual objects. Hence, even if
we could fix the µ-context c ∈ Cm, when iterating m we would generally obtain
different results, so that for every property E we could evaluate a frequency ap-
proaching (in the large numbers limit) the probability that an individual object
in the state S possesses the property E in the µ-context c. But we cannot control
c, which may change in every round. By assigning a probability to every c ∈ Cm,
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we conclude that the frequencies that are obtained actually approach the mean
over Cm of the probabilities defined above. It is then reasonable to identify
this mean with the quantum probability of E in the state S, which implies that
quantum probabilities take simultaneously into account both the sources of ran-
domness listed above. We will see in the next sections that this idea, together
with contextuality, can explain the non-Kolmogorovian character of quantum
probabilities, together with the rather surprising fact that their values neither
depend on µ-contexts nor on macroscopic contexts (see, e.g., Mermin, 1993).
To avoid unnecessary restrictions of our framework, however, we will not refer
in the following to individual objects and consider only measurements directly
testing probabilities, consistently with the minimal interpretations of QM (see
footnote 4).
4 The formal language L
Bearing in mind the epistemological and physical preliminaries in Sections 2
and 3, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4.1. We denote by T the class of theories in which the notions
of entity, property and state are explicitly introduced, together with a notion
of measurement (hence, implicitly, of macroscopic context). We then denote
by Tµ ⊂ T the subclass of theories in which each macroscopic context can be
associated with a set of microscopic contexts (µ-contexts).
Examples of theories in Tµ are CM, SM and QM, but Tmay contain also non-
physical theories, such as the models in cognitive sciences that use a quantum
formalism (see, e.g., Aerts et al., 2015; 2016). Moreover, we implement the
idea of incorporating contextuality in the basic language of a contextual theory
T ∈ Tµ by constructing a formalized language L that is intended to provide
a rational reconstruction of the basic language of every T ∈ Tµ (hence L can
be considered as a part of the formalism of T ). To this end we agree to use
standard symbols in set theory and logic. In particular, c, ∩, ∪, ⊂, \, ∅ and P(Ψ)
will denote complementation, intersection, union, inclusion, difference, empty
set and power set of the set Ψ, respectively. Furthermore N will denote the set
of natural numbers.
Definition 4.2. We call entity the triple H=(E, S, C), where E, S and C
are disjoint sets whose elements we call properties, states and µ-contexts, re-
spectively. Then, a basic language L for H is a classical propositional language,
constructed as follows.
Syntax.
(i) A set Πa = Πa
EC
∪Πa
S
of atomic propositions, with Πa
EC
= {αEc | E ∈ E , c ∈ C}
a subset of atomic context-depending propositions and Πa
S
= {αS | S ∈ S} a
subset of atomic state propositions.
(ii) Connectives ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or).
(iii) Parentheses (,).
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(iv) A set Π of atomic and molecular propositions of L, obtained by applying
recursively standard formation rules in classical logic (to be precise, for every
A ∈ Πa, A ∈ Π; for every A ∈ Π, ¬A ∈ Π; for every A,B ∈ Π, A ∧B ∈ Π and
A ∨B ∈ Π).
Semantics.
A set W of truth assignments on Π, each element of which is a mapping
w : Π −→ {t, f}
(where t stands for true and f for false) that satisfies the standard (recursive)
assignment rules of classical logic (to be precise, let A,B ∈ Π; then, w(¬A) = t
iff w(A) = f , w(A ∧ B) = t iff w(A) = t and w(B) = t, w(A ∨ B) = t iff
w(A) = t or w(B) = t) and, furthermore, is such that, for every S, S′ ∈ S,
S 6= S′ implies that w(αS′) = f whenever w(αS) = t.
We note explicitly that the last clause in the definition of w is suggested by
the interpretation of states as equivalence classes of preparation procedures (see
Section 3).
The logical preorder and the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of L can then be
introduced in a standard way, as follows.
Definition 4.3. We denote by < and ≡ the (reflexive and transitive) rela-
tion of logical preorder and the relation of logical equivalence on Π, respectively,
defined by standard rules in classical logic (to be precise, for every A,B ∈ Π,
A < B iff, for every w ∈ W , w(B) = t whenever w(A) = t, and A ≡ B iff
A < B and B < A). Moreover we put Π′ = Π/ ≡ and denote by <′ the partial
order canonically induced by < on Π′. Then (Π′, <′) is a boolean lattice (the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of L) whose operations ¬′, ∧′,∨′ are canonically
induced on Π′ by ¬, ∧, ∨, respectively).
As stated in Definition 4.2, the language L is a classical propositional lan-
guage. Its interpretation, however, introduces some innovative features. Indeed
the words state, property and µ-context occur in Definition 4.2 just as nouns of
elements of sets, but obviously refer to an empirical interpretation that makes
such elements correspond to empirical entities denoted with the same nouns.
Then, a state S is associated in L with a state-proposition αS that is argument
of truth assignments and is interpreted as ”the entity H is in the state S” (at
variance with known views in quantum logic that consider states as possible
worlds of a Kripkean semantics; see, e.g., Dalla Chiara et al., 2004). A property
E is associated instead with a family {αEc}c∈C of context-depending proposi-
tions of L, where αEc is argument of truth assignments and is interpreted as
”the entity H possesses the property E in the µ-context c”.
Remark 4.1. Our physical preliminaries in Sect. 3 are based on an inter-
pretation of QM showing that there may be theories in T that have individual
objects and their properties as referents. In such theories each truth assignment
could be associated with a set of individual objects that are in a given state and
possess the same context-depending properties. Hence one could modify the
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language L by considering every A ∈ Πa as a monadic predicate rather than a
proposition, and introducing individual variables to be interpreted on individual
objects. This choice would make our construction more intuitive, and has been
done in a previous paper (see footnote 4). Nevertheless we avoid referring to
individual objects here and in the following because of the reasons expounded
at the end of Section 3.
5 A µ-contextual probability structure on L
Following Williamson (2002), we introduce now a probability measure on L by
means of the following definitions and propositions.
Definition 5.1. Let A ∈ Π. Then, we set
Ext : Π −→ P(W ), A −→ {w ∈ W |w(A) = t}
and say that Ext(A) is the extension of the proposition A.
We stress that the extension of a proposition A generally depends on the
µ-contexts that occur in the formal expression of A.
Proposition 5.1. The mapping Ext satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For every A ∈ Π, Ext(¬A) =W \ Ext(A) = (Ext(A))c.
(ii) For every A,B ∈ Π, Ext(A ∧B) = Ext(A) ∩ Ext(B).
(iii) For every A,B ∈ Π, Ext(A ∨B) = Ext(A) ∪Ext(B).
(iv) For every A ∈ Π, Ext(A ∨ ¬A) =W and Ext(A ∧ ¬A) = ∅.
(v) For every A,B ∈ Π, A < B iff Ext(A) ⊂ Ext(B) and A ≡ B iff
Ext(A) = Ext(B).
Moreover, the algebraic structure Θ = (Ext(Π),c ,∩,∪) is a Boolean algebra
isomorphic to (Π′,¬′,∧′,∨′).
Proof. Straightforward from Definitions 4.1, 4.2 and 5.1.
Definition 5.2. Let Φ = (W,Θ, ξ) be a classical probability space,7 let
Π+ ⊂ Π be the set of propositions such that, for every B ∈ Π+, ξ(Ext(B)) 6= 0,
and let p be a binary mapping such that
p : Π×Π+ −→ [0, 1], (A,B) −→ p(A | B) = ξ(Ext(A)∩Ext(B))
ξ(Ext(B)) .
We say that the pair (Φ, p) is a µ-contextual probability structure on L
and that p(A | B) is the µ-contextual conditional probability of A given B.
Moreover, whenever Ext(B) = W we say that p(A | B) is the µ-contextual
absolute probability of A and simply write p(A) in place of p(A | B).
7Following a standard terminology, we call classical probability space here any triple
(Ω,Σ, ξ), where Ω is a set, Σ is a Boolean σ-subalgebra of P(Ω), and ξ : Σ −→ [0, 1] is
a mapping satisfying the following conditions: (i) ξ(Ω) = 1; (ii) if {∆i}i∈N is a family of
pairwise disjoint elements of Σ, then ξ(∪i∆i) = Σiξ(∆i).
11
The terminology introduced in Definition 5.2 (where the word µ-contestual
emphasizes that probabilities depend on µ-contexts through the propositions of
L) is justified by the following statement.
Proposition 5.2. Let B ∈ Π+. Then, the mapping
pB : Π −→ [0, 1], A −→ p(A | B)
satisfies the following conditions.
(i) Let A ∈ Π be such that Ext(A) =W (equivalently, A ≡ A∨¬A). Then,
pB(A) = 1.
(ii) Let {Ai}i∈N be a family of propositions such that, for every k, l ∈
N , Ext(Ak) ∩ Ext(Al) = ∅ (equivalently, Ak < ¬Al). Then, pB(∨iAi) =∑
i pB(Ai).
Proof. Straightforward.
Proposition 5.2 shows indeed that, for every B ∈ Π+, pB is a probability
measure on (Π,¬,∧,∨). Moreover Bayes’ theorem can easily be proved in our
framework.
Proposition 5.3. Let A,B ∈ Π+. Then, the following equation holds.
p(B)p(A | B) = p(A)p(B | A).
Proof. Straightforward.
Examples. Let E,F ∈ E , R,S ∈ S, c, d ∈ C, and let αFd, αS ∈ Π+. Then,
we obtain from Definition 5.2:
(i) p(αEc | αFd) =
ξ(Ext(αEc)∩Ext(αFd))
ξ(Ext(αd)) ,
(ii) p(αEc | αS) =
ξ(Ext(αEc)∩Ext(αS))
ξ(Ext(αS))
,
(iii) p(αR | αS) =
ξ(Ext(αR)∩Ext(αS))
ξ(Ext(αS))
,
(iv) p(αS | αEc) =
ξ(Ext(αS)∩Ext(αEc))
ξ(Ext(αEc))
.
Example (iii) is especially interesting because it shows that the µ-contextual
conditional probabilities do not always depend on µ-contexts.
Let us observe now that the above introduction of a probability measure
on L is purely formal. However, it can be intuitively justified by resorting
to the picture of the world introduced in Section 3 when dealing with QM.
Indeed, whenever states are interpreted as equivalence classes of preparation
procedures, one can generalize the aforesaid picture and assume that activating
a preparation procedure pi produces an individual object that is in a given state
S and, for every µ-context c, possesses a given set of properties depending on c,
thus determining a truth assignment on L. Activating again pi produces another
individual object that still is in the state S, but generally possesses a different
set of properties for some c ∈ C, because we cannot control the preparation
procedure at a microscopic level (see (ii) in Section 3), thus determining a
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truth assignment on L that differs from the previous one. Given a universe U
of individual objects, we can then maintain that every individual object can
be associated with a truth assignment on L and that this correspondence is,
generally, many-to-one. Let us roughly reason in finite terms (we are only
looking for an intuitive justification of our mathematical structure here) and
let us consider the set Ext(αS) of all truth assignments that assign the value
t (true) to the atomic proposition αS stating that the entity H is in the state
S (see Section 4). Then, we can assign a weight to αS that is proportional to
the number of individual objects that are associated with truth assignments in
Ext(αS). Furthermore, similar procedures lead to assign a weight to the atomic
proposition αEc stating that the entity H has the property E in the µ-context
c. Hence a weight can be assigned to all propositions of L following obvious
rules. It is thus apparent that the Definitions 5.1 and 5.2 formalize this idea.
Whenever the above intuitive justification of the µ-contextual probability
structure on L is accepted, such structure can be seen as a theoretical expression
of the source of randomness described in Section 3, (ii), and it is important to
stress that it is basically classical. Hence µ-contextual conditional probabilities
admit an epistemic interpretation. In other words, they can be considered as
indexes of our lack of knowledge of the truth assignments on Π. In the framework
of a theory T ∈ T characterized by the pair (F, I) (see Section 2), it may occur
that these probabilities can be evaluated by using the laws of T . But, generally,
they cannot be tested. Indeed, one cannot know the physical situation at a
microscopic level, hence the µ-contexts associated, via I, with it. Therefore,
µ-contextual probabilities must be considered as theoretical entities that can be
empirically interpreted only indirectly (see again Section 2). The next Section
is then devoted to discuss this issue in greater detail.
6 Measurements and mean probabilities
The predictions of a fully developed scientific theory are usually checked by
means of measurements whose theoretical description is part of the theoretical
language of the theory. In the present paper we are interested in the theories in
which µ-contexts and tests of probabilities are introduced. Hence, the formal
apparatus of each theory of this kind must include not only a µ-contextual prob-
ability structure on L, but also a theoretical description of the measurements
that correspond to tests of probabilities via the empirical interpretation of the
theory (see Setion 2). The physical preliminaries in Section 3 then provide us
again with some important suggestions. Firstly, a measurement may refer to
more than one atomic proposition simultaneously. Secondly, the theoretical de-
scription must consider a subset of µ-contexts that correspond to the possible
microscopic empirical situations underlying the test of probability. Thirdly, a
probability measure must be defined on the foregoing subset of µ-contexts to
take into account our limited knowledge of the microscopic empirical situation
when a test of probability is performed.
Bearing in mind the requirements above, we introduce the definition that
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follows.
Definition 6.1. We denote by TµM the subclass of Tµ characterized by the
following conditions.
(i) For every T ∈ TµM, a µ-contextual probability structure on L is defined.
(ii) For every T ∈ TµM, every E ∈ E is associated with a set ME of
measurement procedures, and every M ∈ ME determines a macroscopic mea-
surement context CM associated with a classical probability space (CM ,ΣM , νM ),
where CM is a subset of µ-contexts such that, for every c ∈ CM , {c} belongs to
ΣM .
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(iii) For every S ∈ S, αS ∈ Π+.
Generally, however, a test of probability refers to non-atomic (i.e. molecular)
propositions, which may require considering several atomic propositions (hence
several states, properties and µ-contexts) simultaneously, consistently with the
first suggestion above. We are thus naturally led to introduce the notions of
compatibility, testability and joint testability as follows.
Definition 6.2. Let us consider a theory T ∈ TµM and a non-empty count-
able set {E,F, ...} ∈ P(E) of properties of L. We say that E,F, ... are compat-
ible (in T ) iff ME ∩MF ∩ ... 6= ∅.
Moreover, for every A ∈ Π, let EA = {E,F, ...} be the (finite) set of all the
properties that occur (as indexes) in the formal expression of A (together with
indexes in C). We say that A is testable (in T ) iff the following conditions
hold.
(i) No atomic state proposition occurs in A (hence EA 6= ∅).
(ii) E,F, ... are compatible.
(iii) E,F, ... occur in the formal expression of A together with the same index
c, and a measurement procedure M ∈ ME ∩MF ∩ ... exists such that c ∈ CM .
Then, we denote by Πτ the set of all testable propositions of Π, and for
every A ∈ Πτ we write A(c) in place of A whenever explicit reference to the
µ-context c defined in (iii) must be done.
Finally, let {A,B, ...} be a non-empty finite set of propositions of Πτ . We
say that A,B, ... are jointly testable (in T ) iff the proposition A ∨ B ∨ ... is
testable.
Based on Definition 6.2 we state the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. Let T ∈ TµM. Then, the following statements hold in
T .
(i) Let us denote by k the binary compatibility relation on E defined by
setting
for every E,F ∈ E, EkF iff E and F are compatible.
8The theoretical notion of measurement procedure introduced here is rather abstract be-
cause we want it to correspond, via empirical interpretation, to procedures thet never make
reference to individual objects (see footnote 4). However, every quantum measurement of the
kind considered in Section 3 can be considered a measurement procedure in the sense defined
above.
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Then, k is reflexive and symmetric, but, generally, not transitive.
(ii) Let E ∈ E , M ∈ ME and c ∈ CM . Then, the atomic proposition αEc
belongs to Πτ .
(iii) Let M ∈ ME, c ∈ CM and A = A(c) ∈ Πτ . Then, A = {A(c′) | c′ ∈ CM} ⊂
Πτ (equivalently, for every c
′ ∈ CM , A(c
′) ∈ Πτ ).
Proof. Straightforward.
It remains to understand what one actually checks by means of a test of prob-
ability performed by means of a measurement procedureM ∈ME∩MF ∩ ...(to
be precise, by means of the empirical measurement procedure corresponding
to M via an empirical interpretation). Therefore, let us resort again to the
intuitive picture sketched in Section 3 with reference to QM. Such a picture
suggests that, if a measurement is performed of the (compatible) properties
E,F, ... that occur in a proposition A(c) ∈ Πτ by means of a measurement
procedure M ∈ ME ∩ MF ∩ ..., then a µ-context occurs which one cannot
control. Hence one cannot know whether the measurement allows to know the
truth value of A(c) or the truth value of another proposition A(c′) ∈ A. When
the measurement is iterated, we obtain frequencies that approach a mean over
A (hence over CM ), in the large number limit, of the µ-contextual conditional
probabilities defined in Section 5.
We add that we are generally interested in a class of theories in which all
tests corresponding to measurement procedures that belong to ME ∩MF ∩ ...
yield the same results, which requires that such procedures be probabilistically
equivalent (e.g., the registering devices considered in Section 3).
The following definition formalizes the above ideas.
Definition 6.3. Let T ∈ TµM, let ΠS = {A ∈ Π | EA = ∅} be the set of all
propositions in which no symbol of property occurs (briefly, state-propositions),
and let A,B ∈ Πτ ∪ΠS , with A and B jointly testable whenever they both belong
to Πτ . Then we introduce the following averages of µ-contextual probabilities.
(i) Let A,B ∈ Πτ , hence A = A(c), B = B(c), with c ∈ CM . Let M ∈
ME ∩MF ∩ ..., E,F, ... ∈ EA ∨ EB, and B(c) ∈ Π+ for every c ∈ CM . We set
< p(A | B) >CM=
∑
c∈CM
νM ({c})p(A(c) | B(c)).
(ii) Let A ∈ Πτ , B ∈ ΠS , hence A = A(c) with c ∈ CM . Let M ∈ ME ∩
MF ∩ ..., E,F, ... ∈ EA, and B ∈ Π+. We set
< p(A | B) >CM=
∑
c∈CM
νM ({c})p(A(c) | B).
(iii) Let A ∈ ΠS , B ∈ Πτ , hence B = B(c), with c ∈ CM . Let M ∈
ME ∩MF ∩ ..., E,F, ... ∈ EB, and B(c) ∈ Π
+ for every c ∈ CM . We set
< p(A | B) >CM=
∑
c∈CM
νM ({c})p(A | B(c)).
(iv) Let A,B ∈ ΠS and B ∈ Π+. For every measurement procedure M we
set
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< p(A | B) >CM=
∑
ccCM
νM ({c})p(A | B) = p(A | B).
In case (iv) the reference to CM in < p(A | B) >CM can be dropped. More-
over, we denote by TµMP the subclass of TµM which consists of all theories
satisfying the condition that, if A,B ∈ Πτ ∪ ΠS are such that EA ∨ EB 6= ∅,
and < p(A | B) >CM is defined, then for every N ∈ME ∩MF ∩ ... the average
< p(A | B) >CN is also defined and coincides with < p(A | B) >CM . Therefore,
whenever T ∈ TµMP we drop the reference to CM in < p(A | B) >CM , say that
< p(A | B) > is the mean conditional probability of A given B and briefly
write < p(A) > in place of < p(A | B) > if Ext(B) =W .
By referring to Definition 6.3 we can maintain that, for every T ∈ TµMP ,
the empirical interpretation makes M correspond to a mean probability test
that produces an outcome which is expected to coincide with < p(A | B) >. Of
course, the actual results never fulfil this expectation exactly, and it is a difficult
task to decide what the disagreement means (it can be considered so small that
T is confirmed, or so big that T is falsified, or it can be attributed to flaws in
the preparing and registering devices, etc.). However, we will not deal with this
issue here.
We stress that mean conditional probabilities are introduced in a Kolmogoro-
vian framework to take into account two different kinds of ignorance. First, the
lack of knowledge about the truth assignments on Π mentioned at the end of Sec-
tion 5. Second, the ignorance of the µ-contexts to be associated with a probabil-
ity test. Hence mean conditional probabilities admit an epistemic interpretation.
Notwithstanding this, they are not bound to satisfy Kolmogorov’s assumptions,
for they are average quantities. In particular, it follows from Definition 6.3 that
< p(A) >< p(A | B) > is generally different from < p(B) >< p(B | A) >.
Hence a formal analogous of the Bayes theorem does not hold in the case of
mean conditional probabilities.
Finally, let us observe that the above definition of mean conditional proba-
bilities and mean probability tests are conceptually similar to the universal av-
erages and the universal measurements, respectively, introduced by Aerts and
Sassoli de Bianchi (2014, 2017). Moreover the recognition that two kinds of
lack of knowledge occur when a measurement is performed also recalls the per-
spective proposed by these authors. As we have anticipated in Section 1, we
therefore make a brief comparison of our approach with Aerts and Sassoli de
Bianchi’s in the Appendix.
7 Q-probability
The set E of all properties is fundamental in every T ∈ TµMP . We intend to
focus on it in the present section and show that the notions and definitions
in Section 6 allow to define, whenever some conditions on mean conditional
probabilities are satisfied, a family of quantum-like probability measures on E
parametrized by the set of all states. To reach our aim, let us preliminarily
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recall that, for all E ∈ E , M ∈ ME and c ∈ CM , αEc belongs to Πτ because of
Proposition 6.1, (ii). Then we introduce the following definition.
Definition 7.1. Let us consider a theory T ∈ TµMP , let E ∈ E, M ∈ ME,
c ∈ CM , S ∈ S, and let PS(E) be the mean conditional probability of αEc given
αS, that is,
PS(E) =< p(αEc | αS) >=
∑
c∈CM
νM ({c})p(αEc | αS)
=
∑
c∈CM
νM ({c})
ξ(Ext(αEc)∩Ext(αS))
ξ(Ext(αS))
.
Then, we denote by ≺ and ≈ the preorder and the equivalence relation on
E, respectively, defined by setting, for every E,F ∈ E,
E ≺ F iff, for every S ∈ S, PS(E) ≤ PS(F )
and
E ≈ F iff E ≺ F and F ≺ E.
It is now important to consider a special case that allows to place physi-
cal theories as CM, SM and QM within the general framework constructed in
Sections 4-6. To this end we introduce the following definition.
Definition 7.2. Let us consider a theory T ∈ TpMP such that ≺ is a
partial order and (E ,≺) is an orthocomplemented lattice. We denote meet, join,
orthocomplementation, least element and greatest element of (E ,≺) by ⋓, ⋒,
⊥, O and U, respectively. Moreover, we denote by ⊥ the (binary) orthogonality
relation canonically induced by ⊥ on (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥)9. Then, for every S ∈ S, we
say that the mapping
PS : E −→ [0, 1], E −→ PS(E)
is a generalized probability measure on (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥) iff it satisfies the following
conditions.
(i) PS(U) = 1.
(ii) If {Ei}i∈N is a family of properties that are pairwise disjoint (i.e., for
every k, l ∈ N , Ek⊥El), then
PS(⋒iEi) =
∑
i PS(Ei).
Let E ∈ E . Whenever PS is a generalized probability measure on (E ,⋓,⋒,⊥),
we say that PS(E) is the q-probability of E given S.
Definition 7.2 implies that a generalized probability measure PS is a classical
probability measure only if (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥) is a Boolean lattice. Hence, generally,
9We recall that ⊥ is a unary operation on (E,≺) such that, for every E,F ∈ E, E⊥⊥ = E,
E ≺ F implies F⊥ ≺ E⊥, E ⋓ E⊥ = O and E ⋒ E⊥ = U. Then ⊥ is the non-reflexive and
symmetric binary relation on E defined by setting, for every E,F ∈ E, E⊥F iff E ≺ F⊥.
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PS does not satisfy Kolmogorov’s assumptions. Nevertheless, the q-probability
PS(E) of a property E ∈ E given S admits an epistemic interpretation and can
be empirically tested, as it is a special case of the mean conditional probability
introduced in Definition 6.3. It is then natural to wonder whether a conditional
q-probability of a property E ∈ E given another property F ∈ E can be defined
by means of PS , generalizing standard procedures in classical propositional logic.
But if one tries to put
PS(E | F ) =
PS(E⋓F )
PS(F )
,
then the mapping
PSF : E ∈ E −→ PS(E | F ) ∈ [0, 1]
is not a generalized probability measure on (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥) whenever this lattice is
not boolean. Indeed, consider a property E = E1 ⋒ E2, with E1, E2 ∈ E and
E1⊥E2. We obtain
PSF (E) = PSF (E1 ⋒ E2) = PS(E1 ⋒ E2 | F ) =
PS((E1⋒E2)⋓F )
PS(F )
,
which is generally different from
PS((E1⋓F )⋒(E2⋓F ))
PS(F )
= PS(E1 | F ) + PS(E2 | F ) = PSF (E1) + PSF (E2)
whenever (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥) is not distributive.
One can, however, introduce a non-standard kind of conditional probability
by considering mean probability tests performed in sequence rather than con-
jointly. Indeed one can again draw inspiration from QM and single out theories
in TµMP where measurement procedures exist which correspond, via empirical
interpretation, to mean probability tests that filter the sample of the entity that
is considered in a prefixed way, producing a new sample on which the same or
a different test can be performed. Moreover, still inspired by QM, we are inter-
ested in those mean probability tests that yield frequency 1 when repeated on
the new sample. We therefore introduce the following definition.
Definition 7.3. Let us consider a theory T ∈ TpMP and for every E ∈ E let
us put SE = {S ∈ S | PS(E) 6= 0}. Then we say that a measurement procedure
M ∈ ME is of first kind iff it is associated with a mapping
tE : SE −→ SE , S −→ tE(S)
such that PtE(S)(E) = 1. For every E ∈ E and first kind measurement procedure
M ∈ ME we then put
PS(F‖E) = PtE(S)(F ).
18
Moreover, let (E ,≺) be an orhocomplemented lattice in T and let PS and
PtE(S) be generalized probability measures on (E ,≺). Then we say that PS(F‖E)
is the conditional q-probability of F given E and S.
If a theory T ∈ TpMP contains a first kind measurement procedure M ∈
ME , then PS(F‖E) can be tested whenever S ∈ SE , as mean probability tests
always exist for PtE(S)(F ) (see Section 6; however, no analogous of the Bayes
theorem can be stated for conditional q-probabilities). Definition 7.3 thus in-
troduces a non-standard conditional probability on (E ,≺) that can be tested
and coexists with the µ-contextual conditional probability introduced in Defini-
tion 5.2, which instead cannot be tested directly and has the status of a purely
theoretical notion.
8 Physical theories
The subclass TµMP of TMP has been introduced in Definition 6.3 mainly by
bearing in mind QM (see Section 3). Nevertheless, some features of TµMP (as
those listed in Definitions 6.1 and 6.4) do not occur explicitly in the standard
formulation of QM. But if we assume that they underlie it, so that QM belongs
to TµMP , we can explain some relevant aspects of QM in terms of the general
notions characterizing TµMP and obtain a new perspective on quantum proba-
bility (see Section 1). Moreover, also CM and SM can be considered as theories
belonging to TµMP , even if they represent very special cases in which all the
notions introduced in the previous sections collapse into standard notions. We
therefore discuss both CM and QM in the present section, leaving apart SM,
whose treatment is obviously similar to the treatment of CM.
8.1 Classical mechanics
Let us begin by listing some basic features of CM, some of which can be deduced
at once from the phase space representation of states and properties.
(i) CM deals with individual objects (see Remark 4.1), their (pure) states and
(physical) properties. Both macroscopic and microscopic measurement contexts
can be introduced in it and supplied with an intuitive (intended) interpretation,
but it is assumed that each individual object either possesses or does not possess
any property that is considered, independently of any measurement procedure.
(ii) Whenever the state S of an individual object x is given, the set of all
properties possessed by x is determined by S, and it is different from the set of
properties possessed by another individual object in a state S′ different from S.
(iii) For every finite set {E,F, ...} of properties and individual object x, one
can check, at least in principle, which properties in {E,F, ...} are possessed by
x and which are not by performing an (exact) measurement that consists in
measuring simultaneously E,F, ... .
(iv) Different properties can be assumed to have different phase space repre-
sentations (grouping together empirically equivalent measurement procedures),
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hence they are not equivalent, in the sense that there are individual objects that
possess one of them and not the other.
(v) Every negation of a property is a property, and every (finite) conjunction
or disjunction of properties is a property (see, e.g., Garola and Sozzo, 2013).
(vi) For every property E and individual object x, a measurement exists (at
least as a limit of real measurements) which establishes whether x possesses or
does not possess the property E without perturbing the state S of x.
Let us discuss now how the general notions introduced in Sections 4-7 spe-
cialize in the case of CM.
First of all, (i) implies that macroscopic and microscopic contexts play no
role in the truth assignments on Π. Hence, for every w ∈ W , E ∈ E, C,D ∈ C,
the equality w(αEC) = w(αED) holds in CM, which implies αEC ≡ αED (see
Definition 4.2), Ext(αEC) = Ext(αED) (see Definition 5.1) and ξ(Ext(αEC)) =
ξ(Ext(αED)) (see Definition 5.2). Therefore, we can drop any reference to µ-
contexts in the following. In particular, we write αE and Π
a
E
in place of αEC
and Πa
EC
, respectively, and notice that the mapping τ : E −→ Πa
E
, E −→ αE is
bijective.
Secondly, (ii) implies that, for every w ∈ W and S ∈ S, the requirement
w(αS) = t determines the values of w on all (atomic and molecular) propositions
of Π: in particular, w(αS′) = f for every S
′ 6= S. Hence Ext(αS) (see Definition
5.1) is a singleton, whose unique element we denote by wS . It follows from
Definition 5.2 that, for every E ∈ E, p(αE | αS) ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, every
truth assignment on Π refers to individual objects in a state S, hence for every
w ∈ W a state S ∈ S exists such that w = wS . Therefore, the mapping
s : S −→W,S−→wS is bijective.
Thirdly, let us come to measurements. Then, (iii) implies that, for every
countable set {E,F, ...} ∈ P(E), the properties E,F, ... are compatible in the
sense established in Definition 6.2. Moreover, every proposition A ∈ Π such that
no atomic state proposition occurs in it is testable, that is, A ∈ Πτ . Moreover,
for every non-empty finite set {A,B, ...} ∈ P(Πτ ), the propositions A,B, ... are
jointly testable and the result of an exact measurement neither depends on the
macroscopic context nor on the µ-contexts. Therefore, for every A,B ∈ Πτ∪ΠS ,
if B ∈ Π+ the mean conditional probability < p(A | B) > is defined (see
Definition 6.3) and coincides with p(A | B). The notion of mean conditional
probability thus reduces to the notion of conditional probability. Moreover, the
mapping PS introduced in Definition 7.2 is such that, for every E ∈ E and
S ∈ S,
PS(E) = p(αE | αS) ∈ {0, 1}.
The results obtained above imply that, for every E,F, ... ∈ E , E ≺ F (see
Definition 7.1) iff αE < αF (see Definition 4.3). Indeed, let us recall that
we have assumed in Definition 6.1 that, for every S ∈ S, αS ∈ Π+, hence
ξ(Ext(αS)) 6= 0, which implies ξ({wS}) 6= 0 in CM. Therefore, for every E,F ∈
E , the following sequence of coimplications holds.
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(E ≺ F ) iff (for every S ∈ S, p(αE | αS) ≤ p(αF | αS)) iff (for every S ∈ S,
ξ(Ext(αE) ∩Ext(αS)) ≤ ξ(Ext(αF ) ∩ Ext(αS)) iff (for every wS ∈ W ,
ξ(Ext(αE) ∩ {wS}) ≤ ξ(Ext(αF ) ∩ {wS})) iff (Ext(αE) ⊂ Ext(αF )) iff
(αE < αF ).
It follows that the order structures (E , ≺) and (ΠaE , <) are isomorphic. More-
over, < and ≺ are partial orders. Indeed, (iv) implies that, for every E,F ∈ E ,
if E 6= F then there is a truth assignment wS which assigns the value t to one
of the propositions αE and αF , and value f to the other. Hence αE ≡ αF
iff αE = αF , which implies that < is a partial order on Π
a
E
. Because of the
aforesaid isomorphism, also ≺ is a partial order.
Let us consider now q-probability. Because of (v), (Πa
E
, <) is a Boolean
lattice, hence (E , ≺) is a boolean lattice (whose meet, join and complementation
we denote now, by abuse of language, by ∩, ∪ and c, respectively). Thus, for
every S ∈ S, the q-probability PS is a classical probability measure on (E ,∩,∪,c )
(the proof of this statement follows at once from Proposition 5.2 because of the
equality and isomorphism above). Therefore, for every E,F ∈ E , the conditional
probability in the state S of E given F can be defined in a standard way, as
follows
PS(E | F ) =
PS(E∩F )
PS(F )
∈ {0, 1}.
Finally, let us consider the conditional q-probability PS(E‖F ). Because
of (vi), a first kind measurement procedure exists for every E ∈ E such that
tE (see Definition 7.3) is the identity mapping. We obtain in this case that
PS(E‖F ) = PtF (S)(E) = PS(E). This equality shows that PS(E‖F ) does not
coincide with PS(E | F ) in CM, which illustrates the deep conceptual difference
between standard conditional probability and conditional q-probability.
8.2 Quantum mechanics
At variance with CM, QM is a typical case of theory belonging to T in which
macroscopic contexts play a basic role. To place QM within the general frame-
work constructed in the previous sections, let us assume that QM belongs to
T
µMP (see Definition 6.3) and refer to the language L introduced in Section 4
for this class of theories. Let w ∈ W , E ∈ E, c, d ∈ C. Then, it may occur in
QM that w(αEc) 6= w(αEd), which implies Ext(αEc) 6= Ext(αEd). Moreover,
in Hibert space QM the following mathematical representation holds.
Entity H (physical system) −→ Hilbert space H.
State S −→ Density operator ρS on H.
Property E −→ Orthogonal projection operator PE on H.
Furthermore, the set of all orthogonal projection operators on H is an or-
thomodular lattice in which a partial order is defined independently of any
probability measure. Hence, the representation above induces on E an order,
which we denote by ≪, and (E , ≪) is an orthomodular lattice (the standard
quantum logic mentioned in Section 1).
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Born’s rule then associates a probability value Tr [ρSPE ] (which does not
depend on any context) with the pair (E, S). Hence a quantum probability
QS : E −→ [0, 1], E −→ Tr [ρSPE ]
is defined which is said to be a generalized probability measure on (E , ≪) (see,
e.g., Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981), and the family {QS}S∈S is ordering on
(E , ≪) (ibidem), which means that the order induced by it on E coincides
with ≪. Therefore, the lattice structure of (E , ≪) can be seen as induced by
{QS}S∈S . It follows that the order≪ and the probability QS can be considered
as the specific forms that the order ≺ and the mapping PS , respectively, take
in QM (see Definitions 7.1 and 7.2). We thus obtain in QM
PS(E) =< p(αEC | αS) >= QS(E) = Tr [ρSPE ].
Furthermore, if the quantum probability QS replaces PS in the conditions (i)
and (ii) stated in Definition 7.2, then these conditions are satisfied, which makes
the above classification of QS as generalized probability measure consistent with
Definition 7.2. We thus obtain an interpretation of quantum probability mea-
sures that leads to consider them mean conditional probabilities. They can
therefore be seen as derived notions within a Kolmogorovian framework, as we
have anticipated in Section 1, which explains their non-classical character but
shows that they admit an epistemic interpretation, at variance with their stan-
dard ontic interpretation (see Section 6). Hence our main goal in this paper has
been achieved.
In addition, let us denote by κ the compatibility relation introduced in QM
on the set of all properties by setting, for every pair (E,F ) of properties, EκF
iff [PE , PF ] = 0. This relation is reflexive and symmetric but not transitive.
Hence it can be considered as the specific form that the relation k introduced
in Proposition 6.1 takes in QM.
Coming to measurements, let us recall that first kind measurement proce-
dures exist in QM (see, e.g., Piron, 1976; Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981) and
that the Lu¨ders rule states that, whenever an (ideal), first kind measurement
of a property E is performed on an ensemble described by ρS , the subensemble
that passes the measurement is described by the density operator PEρSPE
Tr[ρ
S
PE ]
. Let
us therefore denote by D (H) the set of all density operators on H. Then the
mapping
τE : D (H) −→ D (H) , ρS −→
PEρSPE
Tr[ρSPE ]
can be considered as the specific form that the mapping tE introduced in Defi-
nition 7.3 takes in QM.
Finally, we recall that the conditional probability QS(F | E), in a state S, of
a property F given a property E, is defined in QM by referring to a measurement
of F after a measurement of E on an ensemble described by ρS , and is given
by
Tr[PFPEρSPEPF ]
Tr[PEρSPE ]
. Hence this quantity can be considered as the specific form
that the conditional q-probability of F given E and S introduced in Definition
7.3 takes in QM. We thus obtain
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PS(F‖E) = QS(F | E) =
Tr[PFPEρSPEPF ]
Tr[PEρSPE ]
.
9 Conclusions
According to the perspective presented in this paper, mean probabilities that
do not satisfy the assumptions of Kolmogorov’s probability theory may occur
within a Kolmogorovian probabilistic framework in several scientific theories as
a consequence of contextuality. By assuming that QM belongs to this class,
we obtain that quantum probability measures can be seen as mean conditional
probabilities that have a non-classical structure but admit an epistemic inter-
pretation, which challenges the standard ontic interpretation of quantum prob-
ability. In addition, we also obtain that some typical features of QM, i.e. the
compatibility relation on the set of all physical properties and the quantum no-
tion of conditional probability, are special cases of general notions that can be
introduced whenever some links between contextuality and nonclassical proba-
bilities are established.
We do not claim that our proposal leads to a complete solution of the quan-
tum measurement problem, as we do not supply in our framework an explicit
explanation of the reduction of the state vector carried out by a quantum mea-
surement, nor avoid the ”paradox” of nonlocality of QM (we coped instead with
this problem in some previous papers, see, e.g., Garola 2015 and Garola et al.,
2016). However, the results resumed above are sufficient in our opinion to justify
our approach to quantum probability.
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APPENDIX
As anticipated in Sections 1 and 6, we intend to make here a brief comparison
of our approach to quantum probability with Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi’s
solution to the measurement problem of QM. This solution was expounded,
in particular, in a technical paper (Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014) and
in a book aiming to make it understandable to a wider audience (Aerts and
Sassoli de Bianchi, 2017). Our comparison will be made mainly referring to the
latter paper, which will make our description of the similarities and differences
between the two approaches simple and intuitive.
To begin with, let us recall that the proposal of Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi
finds its roots in Aerts’ hidden measurements idea (see, e.g., Aerts, 1986). By
developing this idea Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi provide a detailed description
of the measurement process in QM by constructing an elaborate model whose
core is the Bloch representation of the pure states of a spin 12 physical system.
This representation, in which every pure state corresponds to a point on the sur-
face of a three-dimensional sphere, is extended by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi
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by considering the points within the Bloch sphere as representative of new pure
states that do not occur in the standard formalism of QM. The action of an
instrument measuring the spin of the physical system is then represented in the
sphere by means of an elastic band connecting the north with the south pole
of the sphere. When the measurement is performed, the state of the system
moves orthogonally onto the elastic band and sticks to it. Then, the elastic
band breaks in a point whose position on the band is unpredictable, leading
the state either on the north pole (spin up) or on the south pole (spin down),
depending on the position of the breaking point.
To make quantitative the above qualitative description of the measurement
process, Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi characterize the elastic band by means
of a probability distribution whose value in a given point of the band is inter-
preted as the density of probability of breaking at that point. Moreover, when
the measurement is repeated, the new elastic band may be different from the
old one, and in this case it will be characterized by a different probability distri-
bution. Hence, whenever the measurement is repeated many times, to predict
the frequency of each possible outcome one must average over all probability
distributions. The authors call this average universal average, and then call the
measurement universal measurement. A quantum measurement of the spin of
the physical system is then assumed to be a measurement of this kind.
The following remarks are now important.
(i) The experimenter can choose to perform a measurement but cannot
choose the elastic band (at least if he takes every possible precaution to avoid
influencing the outcome). The selection of the elastic band is instead assumed
by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi to be the result of nondeterministic and unpre-
dictable environmental fluctuations. Hence the elastic band corresponds to a
potentiality region and physical quantities do not pre-exist to the measurement
but are actualized by it. Therefore the authors consider quantum probability as
ontic, which fits in well with the standard interpretation of QM.
(ii) In the description of the measuring process probability occurs twice.
Firstly, when the elastic band is characterized by a probability distribution
(probability1 in the following). Secondly, when averaging over probability dis-
tributions to obtain a universal average (probability2 in the following), which
intuitively means that every possible distribution has the same probability to
occur every time the measurement is repeated (because of (i) the experimenter
does not influence in any way the “emerging” of the elastic band).
(iii) Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi’s description of spin 12 measurements is not
a hidden-variables theory in a standard sense. Indeed, it explains the random-
ness of the observed outcomes as a consequence of fluctuations in the measuring
system, consistently with the Aerts’ idea of hidden measurements mentioned
above, rather than a consequence of our incomplete knowledge of the real state
of the measured entity.
After constructing the above model, Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi make a
considerable effort to generalize it to physical entities whose measurements can
give more than two possible outcomes. In this case the mathematical apparatus
becomes much more complicated (in particular, the Bloch sphere becomes a
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hypersphere in a space with more than three dimensions and the elastic band
is substituted by a hypermembrane). Nevertheless the basic features of spin 99
measurements pointed out above remain unchanged, hence we will refer to them
in the following without entering the details of the general model.
Let us come to our approach. Here a canonical distinction between prepar-
ing and registering devices is introduced (Section 3) but no explicit model for
the measurement process is proposed. Rather, a very simple picture assuming
the existence of a microscopic world underlying the macroscopic world of our
everyday experience is provided to justify our formalism intuitively (Section 5).
According to this picture, we do not know what is going on at a microscopic level
both in preparing and in registering devices. When considering the first kind of
lack of knowledge, we are led to introduce a probability measure on the language
L of the theories that we are considering, which takes the place of probability1 in
Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi’s description. Yet, in our approach this probability
is introduced because the quantum description of the state of a physical system
is maintained to be incomplete, according to the spirit of hidden variables theo-
ries (but only context-depending propositions occur in L, which implies that the
“no go” theorems mentioned in footnote 1 do not apply): hence, it is interpreted
as epistemic. When considering the second kind of lack of knowledge we are
led instead to introduce µ-contexts (Section 4), which complies with the hidden
measurements idea and parallels the introduction of the elastic band in Aerts
and Sassoli de Bianchi description. Mean conditional probabilities then parallel
probability2. We, however, do not introduce any assumption of equiprobability
(see (ii) above), which makes our approach slightly more general. More impor-
tant, our mean conditional probabilities bear an epistemic interpretation, for
they are classical weighted means of epistemic probabilities, at variance with
Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi universal averages.
To close, let us recall that Aerts also introduced state property systems (see
Aerts, 1999 and related bibliography), which successively evolved in the state-
context-property (SCoP) formalism (see, e.g., Aerts and Gabora, 2005; such a
formalism was mainly used for working out a theory of concepts, in particular in
the field of quantum cognition). Then, the SCoP formalism can be (partially)
translated into the formalism developed in the present paper, and conversely.
Indeed, its basic structure can be summarized as follows.
(i) Fundamental notions: entity, state, (measurement) context, property (hence
SCoP belongs to the class T, see Definition 4.1).
(ii) Fundamental definitions: set of states Σ, set of contextsM , set of proper-
ties L; entity (Σ,M,L, µ, ν), where µ : Σ×M×Σ −→ [0, 1], (p, e, q) −→ µ(p, e, q)
is a state-transition probability function that represents the likelihood to tran-
sition from the state p to the state q under the influence of the context e, and
ν : Σ × L −→ [0, 1], (p, a) −→ ν(p, a) is a property-applicability function that
estimates how applicable is the property a to the state p of the entity.
Then, based on the physical interpretation of the SCoP formalism, the fol-
lowing bijective correspondences with the formalism introduced in the present
paper can be established.
c1 : Σ −→ S, p −→ S,
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c2 :M −→ ∪E∈EME , e −→Me ∈ MEe for some Ee ∈ E .
c3 : L −→ E , a −→ Ea.
Moreover, µ(p, e, q) has no equivalent in our framework, but, if Me is a first
kind measurement, then q = tEe(S) and µ(p, e, q) = PS(Ee).
Finally, c1 and c3 imply that ν(p, a) can be identified with PS(Ea).
By using the correspondences above, the aforementioned (partial ) transla-
tion can be obtained, which shows that also in this case there are structural
similarities between Aerts’ approach and ours.
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